

*A conference was held in Prague, Czech Republic, in November 2002 that was entitled “Issues Confronting the Post-European World” and that was dedicated to Jan Patočka (1907-1977). The Organization of Phenomenological Organizations was founded on that occasion. The following essay is published in celebration of that event.*

## Essay 39

# Heidegger and the Purpose of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*

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### Abstract

What is the main purpose of G.W.F. Hegel’s seminal work the *Phenomenology of Spirit*? It has spawned two great traditions, namely Marxism and Existentialism. Hegel wrote the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in 1806, in a rush during the battle of Jena. It went out of print, and Hegel did not use it in his lectures. How did Hegel see the purpose of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*? Martin Heidegger gave a lecture in the 1930s on Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in which he identified and discussed four misinterpretations of the intention or purpose of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Those four are (1) it is not Husserlian phenomenology, (2) it is not a typology of philosophical standpoints (K. Jaspers, W. Dilthey), (3) it is not some kind of introduction to philosophy, and (4) it is not some form of rationalism. After an analysis and critique of Heidegger’s hermeneutical interpretation, I offer my own analysis and insight into the purpose of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*. This interpretation follows Hegel more closely and shows connections to Hegel’s *Science of Logic* and his metaphysical system.

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“Ever since Hegel’s Death, everything is merely a countermovement ...”

(Martin Heidegger, *Overcoming Metaphysics*)

## INTRODUCTION

What is the main purpose of G.W.F. Hegel’s (1770-1831) celebrated work the *Phenomenology of Spirit*? It has contributed two great traditions, namely, Marxism and Jean-Paul Sartre’s (1905-1980) Existentialism. Both of these schools would have been offensive to Hegel and surely is not what Hegel intending to do in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Marxism is simply a counterpunch to Hegel. The Existentialism tradition has the same common interest of facticity and human existence. A third important philosopher and theologian is Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) whose anti-Hegelianism is still deeply rooted in Hegelianism.

Another influence of Hegel during the mid to late 1800s, was the straight Hegelianism of the British James Stirling (1820-1909) and the American St. Louis Hegelians, namely, William Harris (1835-1909) and Henry Brokmeyer (1828-1906).

In the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) saw his own work as closer to Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) than to Hegel’s, and yet he has offered many still unpublished seminars on Hegel. Heidegger said that to link the *Phenomenology of Spirit* with his own work *Being and Time* (1927) was nonsense, but he still wanted to engage and encounter Hegel. Heidegger was famous for his interpretation of Kant and his confrontation with Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) at Davos was an important event in his attack on the Neo-Kantians. Heidegger’s Hegel interpretation is not as well known as his attack and radical interpretation of Kant and the Neo-Kantians.

### **Part I: Heidegger’s Kindred Reading of Hegel**

Heidegger and Hegel both had a highly developed and structured metahistories of philosophy. Both of them have written extensively on the history of philosophy and on individual philosophers. Clearly, a historical encounter is important for both of these philosophers. This is the crux of their radical transformation of philosophy. Hegel has thought through the entire course of the history of philosophy up to his time. Heidegger has written more

about the history of philosophy than any other philosopher. Plus, he reflected on the methodology of a dialogue between philosophers. This is true in particular in his interpretation of Kant. Heidegger made scattered remarks over thirty years about his detractors concerning his radical Kant interpretation. One of his remarks was very refreshing. In the Preface to the Second Edition (June 1950) to *Kant and problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger said, "Readers have taken constant offense at the violence of my interpretations. Their allegation of violence can indeed be supported by this text." (*Kant and problem of Metaphysics*. E.T. xx). However, Heidegger's Kant interpretation seems to be much more radical than his engagement with Hegel. There is a lot more at issue with Kant and the Neo-Kantians (which includes Heidegger's teacher, Edmund Husserl, as well) than with Hegel and the Hegelians.

In Heidegger's encounter with Hegel he says, "If we wish to confront Hegel, then we are required to be 'kindred' with him." (E.T., p 31). Heidegger meant that his reading of Hegel was among the family. There were only philosophers here. Hegel made the following remark in one of his earliest publications, "...with respect to the inner essence of philosophy there are neither predecessors nor successors." (*The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, e.t. p.87). This means that the inner essence of philosophy is the same matter for all of us. Heidegger is not the successor to Hegel, or Hegel the predecessor to Heidegger. Each thinker is unique and his thought is radically his own. Again we are all kindred. We are all philosophers here following the "inner essence of philosophy."

In other places, Heidegger spoke of getting at the unthought in a philosopher's thinking. Heidegger stood firmly within the hermeneutical tradition and was keenly aware of the nature of textual interpretation.

Kant said something insightful about the nature of the interpretation of other philosophers, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

I note only that when we compare the thoughts that an author expresses about a subject, in ordinary speech as well as in writings, it is not at all unusual to find that *we understand* him even better than he understood himself, since he may not have determined his concept sufficiently and hence sometimes spoke, or even thought, contrary to his own intention. (*Critique of Pure Reason*, A314.).

Perhaps following Kant we can say that we know Hegel better than he understood himself. This is a large and difficult undertaking, but by looking at

what Hegel did with his writing, we can try to see the single driving force. It is important to see how the underlying assumptions and presuppositions of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the whole ontotheological/metaphysical system come together. The best interpretation needs to include both a general understanding of his entire system and an understanding of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Heidegger only hinted at this combination. For this interpretation, however, this important point will be the guiding method.

Heidegger approvingly quoted Hegel on his “kindred” methodology. In *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, Hegel wrote, “If the living Spirit which dwells in a philosophy is to be revealed, it needs to be born through a kindred spirit.” (HHPS, p.31). This is the place for the encounter and dialogue with the primary matters for thought. Indeed, this is the clearing that is open for us for genuine, authentic philosophical thinking. The task for our thinking is open.

## **Part II: Background on Heidegger's Hegel project**

Many of Heidegger's writings and works on Hegel are not currently planned as part of the collected works, Gesamtausgabe (GA). Why is the Hegel material left out of Heidegger's works? Why did Heidegger not publish more of his works on Hegel?

In 1929 Heidegger taught a course on Idealism and Realism in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The materials for this course have not been published, and currently plans omit them from the collected works (Gesamtausgabe, <http://www.webcom.com/~paf/hb/gesamt.html>). He also taught several other unpublished courses on Hegel: *Science of Logic* (book one) 1925/1926; ontology of Aristotle and Hegel 1927; *Jenenser Realphilosophies* 1934; *Phenomenology of Spirit* 1934, 1935, 1936; Hegel's Metaphysics of History 1939/1940; *Phenomenology of Spirit* 1943; *Logic: Logic of Essence* 1955/1956; *Logic: About the beginning of Science* 1956/1957. None of these materials from these courses has been published, and none is slated for inclusion in the collected works. Heidegger's book length published work called *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (HHPS) comes from an earlier course in 1930/1931 (GA 32).

From 1925 to at least 1968 (43 years) Heidegger was working and writing on Hegel, yet he did not want to publish a large number of his writing on Hegel. For example, in Heidegger's *Heraclitus Seminar* (of 1966/67) with Eugen

Fink (1905-1975), Hegel is the modern philosopher who is mentioned most frequently. So even in an unrelated work, it still seems like Heidegger is in some kind of dialogue with Hegel.

There are three important quotes from Heidegger, which give some indication of how he approached Hegel's philosophy.

- 1) Heidegger said in 1915. "Philosophy...now faces the huge task of fundamentally confronting the system of a historical worldview which is the most powerful with regard to its fullness, its depth, its conceptually, and the richness of its experiences, and which as such has resumed and surpassed all preceding fundamental philosophical problems; that is, it has to confront Hegel" (translation by Karin de Boer, GA 1:410-411).
- 2) Heidegger said in 1946, "In spite of the superficial talk about the breakdown of Hegelian philosophy, one thing remains true: only this philosophy determined reality in the nineteenth century, although not in the external form of a doctrine followed, but rather as metaphysics, as the dominance of beingness in the sense of certainty. The counter movements to this metaphysics belong *to* it. Ever since Hegel's death (1831), everything is merely a countermovement, not only in Germany, but also in Europe. (GA 32:57, "Overcoming Metaphysics," E.T., p. 89).
- 3) Heidegger said in 1958, "Accordingly, philosophy as the self-development of spirit into absolute knowledge and the history of philosophy are identical. No philosophy prior to Hegel's had acquired such a fundamental grounding of philosophy, enabling and requiring philosophizing itself to simultaneously move within its history and be in this movement philosophy itself. ("Hegel and the Greeks," Conference of the Academy of Sciences at Heidelberg. 1958).

Heidegger saw Hegel's philosophy as a huge system and as a task to overcome as part of metaphysics, but Heidegger's philosophical thinking was not close to Hegel. Question: how close is Heidegger to Hegel? – The simple answer is that they are not very close at all. Perhaps the great anti-system thinker Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) is the farthest from Hegel. But this is a digression.

In some ways Hegel's philosophical system is a closed system within itself, so it did not leave much room for Heidegger to try to find the unthought or the unresolved or an opening for a reinterpretation. Some of Heidegger's task of the destructuring of the history of ontology is at work with Hegel in the section

on "Hegel's Concept of Time" in *Being and Time*. (E.T., p. 428), but there is less evidence of this in Heidegger's other works on Hegel. Heidegger did include Hegel in his general remarks on German Idealism, but most of these remarks are not insightful about Hegel and serve only to distance Heidegger from metaphysics as such.

Heidegger seems to be closer to F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854) than to Hegel, when he remarks, "...for Schelling is the truly creative and boldest thinker of this whole age of German philosophy. He is that to such an extent that he drives German Idealism from within right past its own fundamental position." (*Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*, E.T., p. 4). Heidegger made the following interesting statement about Schelling's *Treatise on Human Freedom* when he remarks that it is, "The treatise which shatters Hegel's *Logic* before it was even published." (*Schelling's treatise on the essence of human freedom Treatise*, E.T., p. 97). Thus, it was Schelling that Heidegger saw as the boldest thinker of this epoch, not Hegel. For us this means Hegel still needs to be encountered, and thus his metaphysical systems need to be confronted. Heidegger is still part of that countermovement to movement to Hegel, and if he needs Schelling's help to push the foundations, well so be it.

### **Part III: Heidegger Points To Four Misinterpretations of the *Phenomenology of Spirit (HHPS)***

- 1) *Phenomenology of Spirit* is not Husserlian phenomenology.
- 2) *Phenomenology of Spirit* is not a typology of philosophical standpoints.
- 3) *Phenomenology of Spirit* is not some kind of introduction to philosophy. Heidegger states that this is not a "...transition from so called natural consciousness of sensibility to a genuine speculative philosophical knowledge." (HHPS, p. 29).
- 4) *Phenomenology of Spirit* is not some form of rationalism or, for that matter irrationalism.

#### **A. Remarks on Heidegger's First Misinterpretation**

Heidegger's First Thesis:

*Phenomenology of Spirit* is not Husserlian phenomenology.

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) did not do Hegelian phenomenology. This is obvious to everyone with any training or background in philosophy. Certainly Hegel is not some kind of forerunner of Husserl, either. It is doubtful that Heidegger could find anyone holding this position, other than perhaps some misdirected popular magazine; of course he could not link this misinterpretation to any philosopher. But he wanted to be sure to link the then current usage of phenomenology only to Husserl – no one else including Heidegger was doing “phenomenology.” This is just another way that Heidegger used to distance himself from Husserl and all the present-day schools or “-ism.” Heidegger has always wanted to stand by himself as unique philosopher. Heidegger did not want to be known simply as a student of Husserl’s or as only an assistant to Husserl.

### **B. Remarks on Heidegger’s Second Misinterpretation**

Heidegger’s Second Thesis:

*Phenomenology of Spirit* is not a typology of philosophical standpoints.

Heidegger argued against the position that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* was a typology of philosophical standpoints. Hegel’s shapes of consciousness could be misconstrued by Hegelians as worldviews and types of philosophical standpoint. Is the *Phenomenology* only a question of the typologies of philosophical standpoints? On the hand, Hegel discussed skepticism and stoicism in the earlier part of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*; however, these are not philosophical types, but rather various shapes of self-consciousness. At the end of the Introduction, Hegel says that these are “patterns of consciousness” (*Gestalten des Bewußtseins*).

Kant first used this term in term “*Weltanschauungen*” in the *Critique of Judgment* (1790). Heidegger used this term in the title of his first lecture in 1919. The title of the lecture is “Die Idee der Philosophies und Weltanschauungsproblem.” Heidegger’s own position was more complex on the use of term. In general, following Husserl, Heidegger is against and opposed the position of worldviews as some kind of philosophical standpoint.

Perhaps one philosopher who can be mentioned in this context (who was for philosophy as worldviews) is Karl Jaspers (1883-1969). Karl Jaspers’ work on the *Psychology of WorldView* (*Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, 1919) is perhaps what Heidegger was thinking of when he wrote these remarks.

Heidegger did a review of Jaspers' work in 1921, but he does not discuss Jasper's remarks on Hegel.

Another possible candidate for the position as one who saw philosophy and Hegel as doing philosophy as worldviews, would be Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), whose work entitled *The Essence of Philosophy* discusses some of the same points on concept of worldviews (Weltanschauungen). In this work, Dilthey made a passing comment on Hegel and worldviews (E.T., p. 60-61). In addition, Dilthey published an article entitled "Weltanschauung, Philosophies und Religion" in 1910.

Heidegger was right in calling this position of the *Phenomenology* as stages of worldviews a misinterpretation and misdirection in thinking about Hegel. Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is not worldviews just put together in an arbitrary arrangement. Again, Hegel showed that there is a *necessity* at work in this process of patterns of consciousness, of the history of the education of consciousness, and of the absolute Spirit unfolding. The "We" of self-consciousness is on the way toward the great ending – absolute Knowing. There is a progression upward to higher stages on the path. The philosophical point here is not some collection of worldviews as a topology of philosophical standpoints. The *Phenomenology* is the progress of consciousness moving and striving to the absolute Spirit.

### **C. Remarks on Heidegger's Third Misinterpretation**

Heidegger's Third Thesis:

*Phenomenology of Spirit* is not some kind of introduction to philosophy. Heidegger states that it is not a "...transition from so called natural consciousness of sensibility to a genuine speculative philosophical knowledge." (p. 29).

Heidegger did not elaborate on this misinterpretation. This interpretation ("transition...") is straightforward, and there are lots of reasons to actually support this so-called misinterpretation. This interpretation ("transition...") of Hegel is one of the many intentions that Hegel was thinking of when he wrote the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. So, why did Heidegger not see this at least as part of the purpose of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*? Let us attempt to look at the other side (from Heidegger) and see if we can clarify the purpose of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

There are a number of places where Hegel looked at this issue. If Heidegger's remark of "genuine speculative philosophical knowledge" is taken to mean what it was for Hegel, namely, Science, then the "We" are on the way to standpoint of Science. For example, in the Introduction, Hegel says, "The series of configurations which consciousness goes through along this road is, in reality, the detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science" (*Wissenschaft*). (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, E.T., p. 50). (Bewußtseins selbst zur Wissenschaft. Jener Vorsatz stellt die Bildung in der einfachen Weise des Vorsatzes als unmittelbar abgetan und geschehen vor; dieser Weg aber ist gegen diese Unwahrheit die wirkliche Ausführung.)

Hegel in the *Science of Logic* (*Wissenschaft der Logik*, E.T., p. 48) wrote the following about the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, "The path of this movement goes through every form of the *relation of consciousness to the object* and had the Notion (*Begriff*) of Science (*Wissenschaft*) for its result."

This single interpretation may not be the one all-encompassing interpretation of the purpose of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*: it is evident that Notion or the standpoint of Science is at least one of the results, or goals, or the final purpose and intention of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

The second part of Heidegger's remark was that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* does not start with "natural consciousness of sensibility." This may in fact be true, but only in a very limited sense. Hegel started with consciousness. Perhaps the first object is not "sensibility." The first object according to Hegel is called "sense certainty"; there is a case that the first object is also "knowing." The idea of "sensibility" is a general supposition as to where Hegel starts.

In his work entitled "Hegel's Concept of Experience," Heidegger makes this general point about how the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is not a description of a journey. He said, "...this error [in interpretation] is not accidental. It follows in the train of the book's essence, overtakes and thus conceals it." (*Hegel's Concept of Experience*, 1942, E.T., p. 51).

In addition, Hegel started with the absolute Spirit as well – hidden in the background or underneath the beginning. All beginnings and presuppositions are arduous in philosophy and metaphysics. For Hegel, this whole issue took on a much more decisive role as First Philosophy or First Science. Hegel may have been thinking of Aristotle's metaphysics and the idea of First Philosophy. Aristotle is a very important thinker for Hegel.

So, part of the purpose of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the "detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science" or in other words it is the movement to something like "genuine

speculative philosophical knowledge,” namely, to the Hegelian philosophical Science (*Wissenschaft*).

#### **D. Remarks on Heidegger's Fourth Misinterpretation**

Heidegger's Fourth Thesis:

*Phenomenology of Spirit* is not some form of rationalism, or for that matter, irrationalism.

Heidegger, echoing Schelling said, “Both rationalism and irrationalism represent an external labeling of the standpoint of the Hegelian philosophy, which does not succeed in unfolding this philosophy in terms of the fundamental issue in question.” (E.T., p.30). Calling Hegel's system some kind of -ism does not really help engage and encounter Hegel's thought.

The thinking related to Ismology may be interesting as the history of ideas, but it is definitely not true philosophical thinking. Many philosophers agree with this, but it is difficult to ascertain the nature of true philosophical thinking. (See <http://www.openthought.org/ismbook/>). Real philosophy is more than a little proof for some idea. Philosophy moves in a realm that is not provable by single statements. To try to refute Hegel because of his arguments does not engage his thinking or his metaphysical system. For Hegel, the whole system is the truth. Truth is not in parts of Hegel's system. The system is the inner self-unfolding of Spirit or the absolute Spirit or just the absolute unfolding itself in time. This is not just an analysis or the text of a book. In a fundamental way, this is reality that is in this process.

Back to Heidegger and Hegel. What does Hegel mean by rationalism? Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* shows that, for Hegelianism, rationalism is important. Hegel in 1820 wrote, “What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational.” (et p. 10). This is the famous passage. But in another few later paragraphs, Hegel stated his position even stronger, where he says, “To comprehend what *is*, this is the task of philosophy, because what *is*, *is reason*.” (E.T., p. 11).

Hegel's thinking is in the camp of reason. There are of course the typically rationalists positions, such as Descartes (1596-1650), Leibniz (1646-1716), and even Spinoza (1632-1677). Spinoza's system was in the air of the times and was talked about in intellectual circles, and Hegel's friend Schelling is often linked to Spinoza. Schelling often mimicked Spinoza's method of

geometry, for example, laying down axioms and trying to prove those propositions.

Spinoza's rationalism led to pantheism. This raises the specter of the pantheism controversy ("All-is-one-ists") debated by F.H. Jacobi (1743-1819) and Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786); started by a report about G.E. Lessing (1729-1781). Lessing said he was a Spinozist shortly before his death, according to a report from Jacobi. The pantheism controversy drew Kant (1724-1804) into the dialogue as well. Hegel certainly would have understood his own theological position *vis-a-via* this debate. Hegel made a number of remarks about the shortcomings of Spinoza in the *Science of Logic* (E.T., p. 536). In the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel said, "Spinoza's system is absolute pantheism and monotheism elevated into thought." Hegel sees himself within rationalism. But Hegel's is a different kind of rationalism than Spinoza, for example.

Although Hegel may have thought about matters outside of reason, these were not matters that were philosophical or in Hegelian terms – not contained within Science. These were outside of the scope of philosophy. The philosophical world is for Hegel rational. For Hegel, only the rational fell within the philosophical world.

Hegel wrote in the remarks to paragraph 16 of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline*, "The philosophical encyclopaedia excludes, first of all, mere aggregates of information, such as philology at first appears to be. Secondly, it also (just as decisively) excludes learning that is based on mere arbitrariness, such as heraldry, for instance." (E.T., p. 40). So, according to Hegel there are areas of knowledge and even some kinds of sciences that are outside of his philosophical system.

Thus, Heidegger maybe wrong that this is not some form of rationalism. Heidegger points to "reason and ratio" in his own interpretation of Hegel. But Heidegger was correct in that calling Hegel's system "rationalism" (or, any other -ism) does not deepen our understanding of Hegel's thinking. For example, calling Heidegger's book *Being and Time* a finite *Critique of Pure Reason* may be helpful for understanding some of the issues in *Being and Time*, but it does not really enjoin us to Heidegger's thinking in *Being and Time*. Hegel had a place for Reason in his system, but simply calling him a rationalist does not engage his thinking. There might be a place for the irrational in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but this is off the main point of Hegel's thinking.

### **E. What is Heidegger's Own Interpretation?**

Heidegger's own specific philosophical position *vis-a-via* Hegel was, "If reading the problematic of *Being and Time* into some other text is ever nonsensical, then this is the case with Hegel. For the thesis that the *essence of Being is time* is the exact opposite of what Hegel tried to demonstrate in his entire philosophy." (HHPS, p. 145). Therefore, Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is not some kind of early *Being and Time*. Only Kant has a glimmer of the problematic of *Being and Time*, according to Heidegger in his 1930 lecture. That glimmer was that the meaning of Being (*Sinn von Sein*) is temporality.

What does Heidegger think is the main purpose of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*?

Heidegger summarized by writing that the purpose of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* was "...the *absolute self-presentation of reason* (ratiologos), whose essence and actuality Hegel finds in *absolute Spirit*." (HHPS p. 30). Where did Heidegger find a special place for *reason* (*Vernunft*) in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*? Indeed, according to Hegel, reason is just one of the main stages or shapes of consciousness that Spirit passes through on the way to absolute Knowing. This is not the same idea of reason that Kant was thinking of in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Although Heidegger was trying to read Kant into Hegel, he was unsuccessful in attempting to do so. Hegel owes a lot to Kant for clearing the way of dogmatic metaphysics and for simulating his thinking, but Hegel's own system is not at all Kantian.

## **Part IV: Ferrer's Reading of the Purpose of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit***

### **A. How should we Interpret Hegel's Thinking?**

We will start with a few exordiums.

Ferrer's interpretation of Heidegger's reading of Hegel does not stand in the earlier classical period of Heideggerian scholarship. Nor does it fall in any way in the formulaic schools of Heideggerian interpretations: ultra-orthodox, rejectionist wing, orthodox wing, or liberal-assimilationists. The interpretation does not follow in the new *Beiträge* paradigm shift, either (see Thomas Sheehan's article on "A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Studies").

Rather, I use Heidegger in much the same way that Heidegger used Kant or Hegel, namely, to clarify my own thinking. I am, in fact, using Heidegger to open a door -- to have my own dialogue with thinkers, and, in this case, it is with Hegel's work on the project of the *Science of Experience of Consciousness*, which is later known as the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

In fact, following both Hegel and Husserl, I am subscribing to the grand methodology motto, that is, "to the things themselves" (*die Sachen selbst*). This means for me to view Hegel's project as the Science of Experience of Consciousness, which has become transformed into the infamous *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Although Hegel's work is a "text," it is beyond a "book" and a "text" on some philosophical positions. Can this new interpretation be just one more interpretation among many, standing side-by-side, or am I saying that this interpretation is the only one that is consistent with Hegel's intentions? Is there only one correct meta-interpretation of Hegel's purpose for the *Phenomenology of Spirit*?

We will start with a series of questions before getting to the central purpose of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

How did the word "Phenomenology" develop in Hegel's works?

To begin with, Hegel's earlier title for the *Phenomenology of Spirit* was: *System of Wissenschaft: Part One, Wissenschaft of the Experience of Consciousness*. When the work was finally published in 1807 the title was *System of Science Part One, The Phenomenology of Spirit*. Some of the books we have today have two title pages with a different title on each page. This published work of Hegel's, then in a few years went out of print and Hegel never did use it for his lectures for students. Hegel was working on a new edition when he died in 1831. However, in 1832 a new edition of his *Collected Works (Werke, Berlin, 1832-1845)* came out. The second volume simply had the title of "*Phenomenology of Spirit*." This is the title, as we know it today.

The German title is *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. This is called the *Jena Phenomenology of Spirit*, for the city of Jena, where Hegel wrote this work. Hegel's story is that he finished this work on the eve of Napoleon's October 12, 1806 victory at Jena. As a historical note, Hegel was reading the proofs (January 16, 1807) when he wrote:

Soon, but not quite yet, I will be able to say *bon voyage* to the child. But while reading through the manuscript for printing errors

this one last time I truly often wished I could clear the ship here and there of ballast and make it swifter. With a second edition to follow soon—if it pleases the gods! (*si diis placet?!*) —everything shall come out better. (*Hegel: The Letters*, p. 119).

The second part of the Hegelian system came to be the *Wissenschaft der Logik* (1812-1816), that is the *Science of Logic*, also called the greater logic as compared to the lesser or smaller logic, which is the logic as it appears in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline* or the *Encyclopedia der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1817).

Back to the use of the term “Phenomenology,” it was used by J.H. Lambert (1728-1777) in 1764 the *Neues Organon* and was used by Kant in a number of places. The expression “Phenomenology” was also used by J.G. Fichte (1762-1814) in his Berlin lectures of 1804.

In a letter to J.H. Lambert, Kant stated, “A quite special, though purely negative Science, *general phenomenology* (*phaenomenologia generalis*) seems to me to be presupposed by metaphysics.” (1770). Kant discusses the position of phenomenology in his system in a 1772 letter to Marcus Herz: “The first part would have two sections, (1) *general phenomenology* and (2) metaphysics, but this only with regard to its nature and method.” Kant actually published the *Critique of Pure Reason* eleven years later in 1781. Kant’s work could have been called the *Phenomenology of Pure Reason*.

Both Hegel and Kant viewed their works as something that precedes metaphysics. These are philosophical issues that need to be worked out before actually engaging in creating the metaphysical system. This is not “physics” in the sense of Aristotle. Rather, these works are the presuppositions to metaphysics. Heidegger wrote, “...all philosophy from first to last merely unfolds its *presupposition*.” (*HHPS*, E.T., p. 36). The *Critique of Pure Reason* is after *physics*, and yet before *metaphysics*; it is *a priori*, namely Kant’s expression of the “metaphysics of metaphysics.” Hegel at one point wrote in a similar vein of, “thinking of thinking.”

Kant spoke of phenomenology in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786). The Fourth Chapter is entitled: “*Metaphysical Foundations of Phenomenology*,” but his use of the term is different from Hegel’s. At that point, for Kant, phenomenology meant something like doctrine of appearance or *Erscheinungslehre*.

Walter Kaufmann reported that Novalis (1772-1801) used the term “phenomenology” at this point in time as well. So, the term, phenomenology was being used in the philosophical discourses at the time Hegel used.

How did Hegel come to the change the name of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*?

There was shift from the original design of the book, when “*Wissenschaft*” was in the title. Hegel uses the term “phenomenology” later in Part Three of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Perhaps Hegel thought a book with title of the *Science of Experience of Consciousness* would not sell very well. Heidegger thought this title put too much emphasis on “experience.” Another title could have been: *The Science of the Phenomenology of Experience* or, *Phenomenology of the Experience of Consciousness?* or, the *Experience of Spirit?* For Hegel, it is clear that Spirit was central in his thinking.

The Preface was written several months after the book was essentially finished. The Preface mainly related to Hegel’s entire philosophical system. It was not just a Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The Introduction functioned more as a Preface than did the real Preface. The Introduction spoke only of the “Science of the Experience of Consciousness” Hegel did not use the term “phenomenology” in the Introduction. Many scholars think that the Introduction was one of the first parts of the book that was written.

Hegel first used the term “phenomenology” in the last section in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, that is, in the section on “Absolute Knowing,” and then later he started using the expression in Preface, since it was written later. The term is used only once in the later part of the book. For a book on the process called the phenomenology of Spirit, it is surprising how little the term is actually used in the book. As far as I can determine, Hegel did not use the term in his much earlier expressions of his system that are extant today. So the first use of term “phenomenology” was in the last chapter, where Hegel wrote, “Whereas the phenomenology of Spirit each moment is the difference of knowledge and Truth, and is the movement in which that difference is cancelled, Science on the other hand does not contain this difference and the canceling of it.” (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, Paragraph, 805). (“Wenn in der Phänomenologie des Geistes jedes Moment der Unterschied des Wissens und der Wahrheit und die Bewegung ist, in welcher er sich aufhebt, so enthält dagegen die Wissenschaft diesen Unterschied und dessen Aufheben nicht...”). It is important to note that Hegel did not italicize the phrase “phenomenology of Spirit.” This means that Hegel in the first use of the term, did not think of it as the title of the

book; it was rather a process. The phenomenology of Spirit can be considered as the appearance of Spirit self-unfolding and coming to itself.

## **B. The Central Issues of the Purpose of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*: Ferrer's Fundamental Interpretation**

### **1. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* and Plato's Allegory of the Cave**

Plato's allegory of the cave starts at the beginning of the seventh book of the dialogue within Plato's *Republic* (514 a2 to 517 a7). The people are chained in the cave and see only the shadows. They do not know that they are seeing only shadows of real things. Plato tells the story of their escape from the cave and how they go outside into the sunlight. The allegory is similar to Hegel's "story" of the Science of the experience of consciousness, namely that, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the journey from inside the cave outside into the sunlight. Heidegger used this allegory for his analysis of "Plato's doctrine of Truth" (1931/32, pub 1940). Although Heidegger did not make the connection, it is obvious by analogy that this is what Hegel was doing in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The *Science of Logic* is then the true form, namely, the ideal form (*ideos/edios*) outside of the cave in the sunlight.

Hegel gave us a very important clue for the analogy and for the book in general, in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where Hegel said, '...the detailed history of the *education* of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science (*Wissenschaft*) (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph, 78). (...*ausführliche Geschichte der Bildung des Bewußtseins selbst zur Wissenschaft*). The German word "*Bildung*" is used by German translators to translate the Greek word "*paideia*" into German. The term is used at the beginning of the allegory of the cave. In the cave the people remove the chains and leave the cave; this is their education in the same way that Hegel thinks of the "education of consciousness." The people head toward the sunlight; the image of the sun is the idea (*idea*) of the good (*agathon*). In one of the last sections of the *Science of Logic*, there is the section entitled "The Idea of the Good" (et P. 818-823). This shows a connection between Plato and Hegel and gives a deeper look at Hegel's work. There are linkages between the content of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic*.

Hegel went on to include history or historical consciousness in a way that no other philosopher had included in his thinking. For Hegel, this was not some

pure consciousness stripped of its historicalness. Self-consciousness and “We” were and are all included in the stuff of history.

Therefore, Hegel led self-consciousness to the last chapter, on the Absolute Knowing. The idea of the good is the absolute Spirit and truth that Hegel has thought of right at the end of the book. Self-consciousness and “We” are on the way to absolute Knowing (*Das absolute Wissen*). The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the path through the stages, the moments, the shapes of consciousness and their relation to the objects (including history, education of consciousness) on the way to Science.

There is a religious dimension to the system. Hegel included a section in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* entitled, “The metaphysical Notion or Conception of the Idea of God.” Hegel declared, “The metaphysical Notion of God here means that we have to speak only of the pure Notion which is real through its own self. Spirit or the Absolute Idea is what appears simply as the unity of the Notion and reality in such a way that the Notion in itself represents totality...” (E.T., p. 348). Hegel thought something similar in the *Science of Logic*, “God as absolute Spirit, which alone is the true nature of God.” (E.T., p. 527). The absolute Idea is more connected with the *Science of Logic*, but we still have absolute Knowing in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

This is tied to Hegel’s ontotheological metaphysics, so this means that the absolute Spirit is the true nature of God. Thus, this is the path to Hegel’s metaphysical God.

Philosophically speaking we are on shake grounds, when we base an analogy on top of an allegory, but I think he gives us a clear understanding of the purpose of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Science of Logic* within the Hegelian metaphysical/theological system.

## 2. Where to Begin a Metaphysical System?

Hegel in the early unpublished text “Logic and Metaphysics” of 1801-1802, wrote, “I believe that only *Logic* can serve as an introduction to philosophy...” (Translation in Forster, p. 589). This important and central issue is how to start philosophy or, more specifically, how to start a metaphysical system. This is one of the main issues about which Hegel seemed to change his philosophical viewpoint overtime. After Hegel wrote the Preface and Introduction to the *Science of Logic*, the next section in the *Science of Logic* is not the infamous Being, Nothing, Becoming – nor is it the “General Division of Being”; the very first part of the main text starts with a deep metaphysical and

speculative question, namely “*With What Must the Science Begin?*” After Hegel wrote this section in *Science of Logic*, his system of first philosophy changed. His entire philosophical system changed.

Hegel started this famous section with the words; “It is only in recent times that thinkers have become aware of the difficulty of finding a beginning in philosophy...” (*Science of Logic*, et p. 67). With this Hegel set the stage for his beginning with *Logic* and the real results of the task, which he called the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Hegel hits the nail on the head with this point. Not only the beginning, but also the whole thought of creating a “system,” then come to fore front and become a burning issue for Hegel.

Hegel wrote, “...the phenomenology of Spirit is the Science of consciousness, the exposition of it, and that consciousness has for result the Notion of Science, i.e., pure Knowing.” (*Science of Logic*, E.T., p. 68). At this point, it should be noted this is the last chapter of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* called “*Absolute Knowing*” (*Das absolute Wissen*). This point for Hegel is now, pure Knowing. As Hegel noted, “...pure Knowing is the ultimate, absolute truth of consciousness.” (*Science of Logic*, E.T., p. 68).

At this point for Hegel, *Logic* is called pure Science. Instead of using the term “absolute” Hegel used the expression “pure.” The *Phenomenology of Spirit* starts with “empirical and sensuous consciousness,” with immediate knowledge not with mediated and pure Knowing. Hegel notes in this section, “*Logic* presupposes the Science of manifested Spirit.” (*Science of Logic*, E.T., p. 68). The Science of manifested Spirit means the description and process of the phenomenology of Spirit as it unfolds.

In other words using, Plato’s allegory, should philosophical systems start with shadows in the cave or with world in the sunlight? The *Phenomenology of Spirit* starts with the shadows and shows “us” the direction up to the sunlight. We can then consider the *Logic* in this allegory as our world in the sunlight. Where do philosophical or metaphysical system (*systema*) start?

Hegel wrote at the end of this section, in a parenthetical remark, “(and *God* has the absolutely undisputed right that the beginning be made with him).” (*Science of Logic*, E.T., p. 78). In addition, Hegel in speaking of the *Logic* as the system of reason, in the realm of pure thought; he noted, “...this content is the exposition of *God* as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite Spirit. (*Science of Logic*, E.T., p. 50). This is a very powerful image of the place of God within the context of Hegel’s theological metaphysics. God’s true nature is as the absolute Spirit. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* leads to the absolute Spirit, but the *Science of Logic* is exposition of *God* before creation.

These parts in the *Logic* are the categories in mind of God before creation. In another part of the *Logic*, namely, the Introduction, Hegel indicated that the chapters and explanations are "...to facilitate a preliminary survey and strictly are only of *historical* value." (*Science of Logic*, E.T., p. 54). So, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is dealing with history, plus, the *Science of Logic* content is of "only historical value." Hegel is making the point at some level that this is not "absolute" and "pure" anything. Hegel's philosophical system is in history in some fundamental way. The "We" (from Hegel's point of view or standpoint) are in history. Even the "reader" or the "writer" of the *Science of Logic* is engaged in a process that is "in" history.

The purpose of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* was to lead to the absolute Spirit, to the absolute pure Knowing, which is Science or the actual standpoint of Science. The *Science of Logic* is pure Science and presupposes the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Hegel noted, "The Notion of pure Science its deduction is therefore presupposed in the present work in so far as the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is nothing other than the deduction of it." (*Science of Logic*, E.T., p. 49).

Hegel is leading us up the ladder to the *Science of Logic* to the absolute beginning. At this point, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is driving us to the beginning of *Science of Logic*, that is, in a general sense to Science and Philosophy. But, this is not Philosophy in the normal sense, but rather, Philosophy as Hegel thought of his speculative metaphysical system. *Science of Logic* is the pure Science. Philosophy does not start as the *Phenomenology of Spirit* does with Sense Certainty (*Die sinnliche Gewißheit*). Philosophy for Hegel started with logic thought of as a metaphysical system. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* takes us (the "We" of historical consciousness) up to the door, or, in our other analogy, it takes us out of the cave into the light.

Philosophy has an absolute beginning, and that beginning is God or the absolute Spirit for Hegel. The absolute metaphysical system must have a beginning, and that beginning is not the *Phenomenology of Spirit*; rather it is the *Science of Logic*, or the beginning just simply starts with the Hegelian logic as such. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is only the ladder to the absolute beginning.

### **3. The Final Goal for Hegel's is the Absolute Notion – Methodology and Movement of the System**

Part of our general misunderstanding of Hegel's system is that we somehow think of it as a static system. Hegel's system actually is *essential in motion*.

Hegel wrote in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, “Here we see land; there is no proposition of *Heraclitus* which I have not adopted in my *Logic*” (E.T., Vol 1, p. 279). Heraclitus was the first philosopher who started his system with change; ‘all-is-flux’ is his motto. Hegel’s system is always a “process” system. There is nothing static about Hegel’s system, so the key is to bring that “processing” (‘all-is-in-motion’) into our interpretation of Hegel. Hegel is not defending the status quo as a static end. The dialectic is the engine of motion and movement within his system. Hegel’s system is describing the world (not a static world) as in motion.

Hegel pointed out in the *Science of Logic*, that his method alone is true. The rest the material within his book is of “only historical value.” Hegel wrote in the last chapter on the “Absolute Idea,” that the “method is only the movement of the *Notion* itself.” (*Science of Logic*, E.T., p. 826). This method is the motor that keeps the system in motion. But the method is “in” the world as well, so it is not just a “subjective” aspect added on to the world; rather it is in the world itself. Hegel wrote:

By virtue of the nature of the *method* just indicated, the *Science (Wissenschaft)* exhibits itself as a *circle* returning upon itself, the end being wound back into the beginning, the simple ground by mediation; this circle is moreover a *circle of circles*, for each individual member as ensouled by the *method* is reflected into itself, so that in returning into the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of the new member. (*Science of Logic*, E.T., p. 842).

At this point, we begin to see Hegel’s true philosophy, his fundamental thinking about how his system is put together. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* in general does not consider methodology issues, whereas, the *Science of Logic* has a number of detailed sections which discuss methodology. The most important is the last section on the “Absolute Idea.” This is part of the infamous dialectical method that Hegel put forth as his methodology (*Science of Logic*, E.T., p. 831).

The circle of circles has an interesting connection to Kant, when he said in the later part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, “Reason is driven by a propensity of its nature to go beyond its use in experience...and to find peace only in the completion of its *circle* in a self-subsisting systematic whole.” (CPR, A798/B826). (In German, *Die Vernunft wird durch einen Hang ihrer Natur getrieben, über den Erfahrungsgebrauch hinauszugehen, und nur allererst in der Vollendung ihres Kreises, in einem für sich .... bestehenden systematischen*

*Ganzen, Ruhe zu finden*). Reason finds its peace in the circle, which is in the systematic whole of a complete and absolute metaphysical system. Kant wanted and knew that reason would lead to the science of a metaphysical system, but he did not make it up the mountain. Hegel said in the Preface, "Through this movement the pure thoughts become Notions (Begriffe) and come to be what they are in truth: self-movements, *circles*, that which is their substance, spiritual entities." (Kaufmann's translation, E.T., p. 52). ( In German, *Durch diese Bewegung werden die reinen Gedanken Begriffe, und sind erst, was sie in Wahrheit sind, Selbstbewegungen, Kreise, das, was ihre Substanz ist, geistige Wesenheiten*). Hegel did not speak of dialectic in the Preface, but Nietzsche had some interesting things to say about the general nature of dialectics.

Nietzsche wrote:

One chooses dialectic only when one has no other means. One knows that one arouses mistrust with it, that it is not very persuasive. Nothing is easier to erase than a dialectical effect: the experience of every meeting at which there are speeches proves this. It can only be self-defense for those who no longer have other weapons. (*Twilight of the Idols*, 1888).

Heidegger does not have much sympathy for dialectics either. Nietzsche concluded, "The most valuable insights are arrived at last; but the most valuable insights are *methods*." (*Will to Power*, 469, 1888, E.T., p. 261). Hegel's method was unmistakably one of the most important parts of his philosophical thinking. For Hegel, philosophy required a very specific methodology to become Science (Philosophy). Hegel indicated in the Preface, where in a more personal way he used the word "I:"

The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of such truth. To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title 'love of knowing' and be *actual* knowing – that is what I have set myself to do. (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, E.T., p. 3)

As to the main purpose of *Phenomenology of Spirit*, here he said, "...goal is the revelation of the depth of Spirit, and this is the *absolute Notion*." (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph 808). (... *Ziel ist die Offenbarung der*

*Tiefe, und diese ist der absolute Begriff*). In the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, the goal is first the absolute Notion and then, secondarily, the goal is absolute Knowing. The absolute Notion and absolute Knowing are both the goals at the end of the journey (remember the cave).

The purpose of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, is to raise consciousness to self-consciousness and onward to the path where (“We”) consciousness in general finds the *absolute Notion*. Hegel said this about his method and that means the Notion as well. He notes, “The *method* itself by means of this moment expands itself into a *system*.” (*Science of Logic*, E.T., p. 838). Hegel rarely wrote about his system, so this important idea is a distinctive link among the Notion, the method, and the system. Hegel clearly said that the “...the absolute method, which has the Notion for its soul and content...(*Science of Logic*, E.T., p. 839). Think about the nature of “the absolute method.” Who today would claim to have “the absolute method”? To continue, he also used the expression the “*Notion as Notion*” (p. 817).

Therefore, philosophers can see (pure, absolute, eternal) Notions as the ideas in the sunlight of Plato’s cave, and yet, the Notion is methodology and the process of the dialectics. Spirit finds its pure element of existence in the Notion. The Notion is the *entelecheia* that is the internal movement of spiritual reality unfolding itself. Hegel late in the *Science of Logic* said, “In point of fact, as the principle of *philosophy* is the *infinite free Notion*, and all of its content rests on that alone.” (*Science of Logic*, E.T., p. 817). In another important passage, he tied the Notion with Philosophy, saying, “*Philosophy* has the same content and the same end as art and religion; but it is the highest mode of apprehending the absolute Idea, because its mode is the highest mode, *the Notion*.” (*Science of Logic*, E.T., p. 824). Thus, the purpose of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is to get us to the standpoint of the *circle of circles*, namely, the pure, absolute, eternal, spiritual, ensouled reflected into itself – Notion.

Hegel used the expression in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, “the seriousness of the Notion” (*der Ernst des Begriffs*). (A. Miller’s translation of this as “serious speculative effort” seems off the point). Right at the end of the Preface, Hegel commented in a personal way, “I find the distinctive mark of Science in the self-movement of the *Notion*...” (*Indem ich das, wodurch die Wissenschaft existiert, in die Selbstbewegung des Begriffes setze*). This plainly points to the importance that the Notion has for Hegel’s system. The final goal for Hegel’s is the absolute Notion; this is his methodology, movement, and the content of his metaphysical system.

## Conclusion

To summarize to this point, the purpose of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is by analogy like Plato's allegory of the cave in the *Republic*. It is the movement from the shadows out of the cave into the sunlight. The purpose of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is to bring us to an absolute beginning. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the ladder to the absolute beginning as the *Science of Logic*. The third point is the *Phenomenology* brings the system to the point of the absolute Notion, which are both the methodology and the movement of Hegel's metaphysical system.

Hegel, in the public announcement about the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) said the following: "It considers the preparation for Science from a standpoint which makes it a new, interesting Science and the first Science in philosophy." (Forster, p. 612).

This is the exactly the point about which Hegel changed his mind as he worked on his system after publishing the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, namely, where his *First Science is philosophy*. Clearly, Hegel stepped back from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* after he wrote it. This is evident from what he wrote in his letters and the fact that he never used the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in his lectures.

Hegel changed his mind. The Jena (1807) *Phenomenology of Spirit* was too subjective. The *Phenomenology of Spirit's* starting point was not philosophy or Science. Hegel concluded that Philosophy is the highest mode of apprehending the absolute Idea through the Notion. Why would Hegel have started with sense certainty as he did in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*? How are the patterns of consciousness, self-consciousness, Reason, Spirit, in their self-unfolding a concern of Philosophy? The education of consciousness through history to Philosophy is important, but it is not Philosophy in the Hegelian sense.

The later Hegel saw in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline* a special place for the location of phenomenology, "phenomenology of Spirit and consciousness," is between "Anthropology and the Soul" as the first section of the Spirit, and then the section that follows the phenomenology is called "Psychology and the Spirit." In other words, the Hegelian order is anthropology, phenomenology, and then psychology. From this point of view, some philosophers have suggested that the phenomenology is just a kind of bad historical sociology that fits between anthropology and psychology.

There is a much bigger general issue here, namely, philosophical anthropology. Heidegger says, "Having become philosophical anthropology, philosophy itself perishes of metaphysics." (*Overcoming Metaphysics*, 1946, E.T., p. 99). Husserl and Heidegger attacked and counterattacked each other over the issue of their philosophies as philosophical anthropology only. Most modern philosophers were general attacked by Heidegger as being merely philosophical anthropologists. Of course, Heidegger connected this position to the metaphysical tendencies of contemporary philosophy.

Husserl, in his attack on philosophical anthropology mentioned Dilthey and Max Scheler (1874-1928), but Heidegger was the one who irks him the most. In his famous essay, Husserl started out saying, "As is well known, over the last decade some of the younger generation of German philosophers have been gravitating with ever increasing speed toward philosophical anthropology." ("Phenomenology and Anthropology" June 1931. E.T., p. 485). Part of his attack was the stinging remarks Husserl made about Heidegger that *Being and Time* was only philosophical anthropology.

To return to the problem of Hegel, Hegel's main thinking was not the transcendental move by Kant or later by Husserl. Hegel was not in the dogmatic tradition of Christian Wolff (1679-1754), nor was he following in the skeptical tradition of Gottlob Schulze (1761-1833). Hegel's own unique thinking was his formulation of the Notion as absolute Spirit unfolding itself. Hegel pulled back from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* because of the same philosophical anthropology issues that came between Husserl and Heidegger. Heidegger is part of the Hegelian countermovement.

Kant said, "The critical path alone is still open." (CPR, A855/B883). Hegel would have said that the actual knowledge of Science was unfolded in his metaphysical system. Kant said, "Metaphysics must be Science, not only as a whole, but in all its parts, otherwise it is nothing." (*Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, 1783). Hegel would have agreed with Kant and said that he had produced such a Science of actual knowing (see above), namely, the metaphysics of the absolute Spirit, which started with the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, then moved onward to the *Science of Logic*, and finally, to the two concrete Sciences – namely, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. This would then "complete the System of Philosophy" (*Science of Logic*, E.T., p. 29). This means Hegel's "*System of Philosophy*," as a whole is the complete absolute metaphysical system.

### A. Final Thoughts

Now it is clear what Hegel's intention were for the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. This interpretation shows how the *Phenomenology of Spirit* fits in the entire system and how it is part of Hegel's more mature thinking in his complete system, namely, in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline*. Hegel foresaw the problem of philosophical anthropology and came up with a new basis for a metaphysical system. Heidegger wanted to overcome and leave all metaphysical systems behind. In Heidegger's second *magnum opus* entitled *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, he said, "The time of 'systems' is over." (E.T., p. 4). Hegel's is the epitome and the most complete metaphysical system. Heidegger did not understand the purpose of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, nor did he confront and shatter Hegel's absolute complete metaphysical system (absolute idealism). Heidegger attempted to go around Hegel; he could not go through Hegel. Hegel's philosophy still determines our philosophical reality!

### B. Research Questions

Where does Hegel's specific use of the term Notion/Concept (*der Begriff*) come from? Historical usage? The last chapter in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is "absolute Knowing" and the last chapter in the *Science of Logic* is the "absolute Idea" then why did he not use expression "the Notion" as part of the chapter heading?

What is left out of Hegel's system and why? Where is Hegel on the irrationalism issue? Is there any room for faith in Hegel's metaphysical system? His ontology seems to be theology and his theology is in his ontology, so where is faith in the system? There does not seem to be any need for faith.

Nietzsche said, "The will to system is lack of integrity." (*Der Wille zum System ist ein Mangel an Rechtschaffenheit*). What kind of dialogue could Hegel have with a philosopher like Nietzsche?

Heidegger in his work on Nietzsche said this about Hegel, "And in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) Hegel grasps the essence of Being as knowing, but grasps knowing as essentially identical to willing." (*Nietzsche* Volume I, E.T., p. 35). What does Heidegger mean that Hegel's understanding of Being is (*Sein*) "Being as will" in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*? Is there some text within the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that supports Heidegger's point here?

Alfred Denker makes an interesting point about the use of expression "the Absolute" in German Idealism. He said, "*Das Unbedingte* and *das Absolute*

are interchangeable.” *Das Unbedingte* is the unconditioned. How should we understand the meaning of the expression “absolute or Absolute” in German Idealism? (See his article, “Three Men Standing over a Dead Dog” in *Schelling: Between Fichte and Hegel*).

For a more recent discussion of the myriad of Hegel’s official and traditional projects within the *Phenomenology of Spirit* see Michael Forster’s eleven tasks. What is the purpose of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* according to Forster?

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Hegel links throughout the Internet:

<http://www.hegel.org/links.html>

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* in German

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